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ABSTRACT
As the amount of content users publish on social networking sites
rises, so do the danger and costs of inadvertently sharing content
with an unintended audience. Studies repeatedly show that users
frequently misconﬁgure their policies or misunderstand the privacy
features offered by social networks.
A way to mitigate these problems is to develop automated tools
to assist users in correctly setting their policy. This paper explores
the viability of one such approach: we examine the extent to which
machine learning can be used to deduce users’ sharing preferences
for content posted on Facebook. To generate data on which to eval-
uate our approach, we conduct an online survey of Facebook users,
gathering their Facebook posts and associated policies, as well as
their intended privacy policy for a subset of the posts. We use this
data to test the efﬁcacy of several algorithms at predicting policies,
and the effects on prediction accuracy of varying the features on
which they base their predictions. We ﬁnd that Facebook’s default
behavior of assigning to a new post the privacy settings of the pre-
ceding one correctly assigns policies for only 67% of posts. The
best of the prediction algorithms we tested outperforms this base-
line for 80% of participants, with an average accuracy of 81%; this
equates to a 45% reduction in the number of posts with misconﬁg-
ured policies. Further, for those participants (66%) whose imple-
mented policy usually matched their intended policy, our approach
predicts the correct privacy settings for 94% of posts.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—Secu-
rity and Protection; I.2.7 [Artiﬁcial Intelligence]: Natural Lan-
guage Processing—Text analysis
Keywords
privacy; social network; Facebook; machine learning; natural lan-
guage processing
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1. INTRODUCTION
As the amount of content that users publish on social network-
ing sites rises, so do the danger and costs of inadvertently sharing
content with an unintended audience. Social networks have tried to
meet this challenge by offering increasing ﬂexibility in the sharing
settings (i.e., access-control policies) and mechanisms that can be
used to restrict the audience of content uploaded by users. These
include allowing users to specify both group-based and per-person
policies [41], automatically creating groups to assist in specifying
sharing settings, and developing interfaces to help users understand
which of their content is visible to others [25].
Despite these efforts, studies show that users frequently miscon-
ﬁgure the access-control policy for the content they share (e.g., [23,
17]). These misconﬁgurations have a variety of undesirable conse-
quences, from causing regret and embarrassment to loss of (real-
life) friendships and jobs [40, 10] to affecting international rela-
tions [28].
One way to mitigate these problems is to develop automated
tools to assist users in correctly setting their policy. A basic step in
that direction is Facebook’s default behavior of suggesting to users
that they protect a new post with exactly the policy they assigned
to their previous post
1.
This paper explores the use of a more powerful automated mech-
anism: we examine the extent to which machine learning can be
used to deduce the users’ sharing preferences for content uploaded
to Facebook. In our approach, a machine-learning algorithm is
trained on a user’s past posts—where “post” refers to any textual
or partially textual content users share—and the policies that were
usedtoprotectthem. Duringthecreationofanewpost, themachine-
learning algorithm evaluates the new content and suggests which of
the policies used on previous posts is the best ﬁt.
To generate data on which to evaluate the effectiveness of our
approach, we conduct an online survey of Facebook users. As part
of the survey, we use a Facebook application to gather participants’
Facebook posts and the policies under which they were published.
We interactively review a random sample of 20 posts with each
participanttodetermineanyinconsistenciesbetweenthepolicythat
wasusedtoprotecteachpostonFacebook(theimplementedpolicy)
and the policy that the participant wished to enact (the intended
policy).
The machine-learning algorithm we focus on, after preliminary
experiments with LLDA [32], is the MaxEnt algorithm [5]. The
features on which the algorithm bases its predictions are chosen
on the basis of best cross-validation performance from the pool of
1Facebook suggests the policy that was assigned to the previous
post when that post was created, ignoring any changes in policy
made after the post was created.features that we considered, including the text of posts, time of cre-
ation, word n-grams, and the presence of URLs and attachments.
We evaluate the effectiveness of these algorithms on test data, kept
aside speciﬁcally for this purpose. In evaluation, we measure accu-
racy with respect to both the policy predicted to be the best match
and the two policies predicted to be most likely; the latter could be
useful if prediction was used to generate a list of likely policies for
the user to choose from.
We show that the baseline with which we compare—Facebook’s
default behavior of assigning to a new post the privacy settings of
the preceding one—is only somewhat effective. Evaluated against
participants’ intended policy, it correctly suggests the policy for
only 67% of posts. In contrast, we show that our machine learning
approach performs signiﬁcantly better, correctly predicting 81% of
the intended policies on average. In predicting the intended policy,
we ﬁnd, unsurprisingly, that the accuracy of our approach strongly
correlates to the availability of good training data. For participants
who indicated (through the review of sampled posts) that their im-
plemented policies matched their intended policies at least 75% of
the time, our approach was almost invariably effective, achieving a
prediction accuracy of 98%. We also ﬁnd that all the post features
we consider are helpful for achieving best prediction accuracy, and
that accuracy ramps up surprisingly quickly as the amount of train-
ing data grows.
We believe these results to be very promising, as they suggest
that it is feasible to use machine learning to effectively help users
in setting the policy for the content they upload to social networks.
Integrating such an approach in a deployed social network would
require that the machine-learning algorithms be able to distinguish
between good-quality and poor-quality training data, which could
be accomplished in a several ways, including by explicitly inter-
acting with users and by examining corrections users make to their
initial policies. We ﬁnd that combining a small amount of good-
quality data with some unknown-quality data yields predictions
sufﬁcientlyaccuratetobepracticallyuseful; thismitigatestheprob-
lem of obtaining a large quantity of good-quality data in a real-
worldapplication. Usedinthisway, anautomatedapproachlikethe
one we explore can signiﬁcantly lower the likelihood that a user’s
momentaryinattentivenesswhilepostingwillleadtoincorrectlyset
privacy settings.
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are the following:
 Wedevelopseveralconﬁgurationsinwhichmachine-learning
algorithms could be used to assist users in setting the policy
for their posts, and several metrics for evaluating the effec-
tiveness of these approaches.
 We test the effectiveness the MaxEnt machine-learning al-
gorithm in these conﬁgurations, including principled experi-
mentationwithdifferentpostfeaturesfortrainingandpredic-
tion, on data collected from Facebook users. The predictions
are correct for 81% of intended policies on average, lead-
ing to a 45% reduction in the number of posts with incor-
rect policies when compared to Facebook’s default method
of suggesting the policy used on the previous post.
 We analyze in detail the circumstances under which our ap-
proach does not perform well. We discover that knowledge
of intended policy combined with discarding poor-quality
data yields prediction accuracies above 95%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes
related work. Section 3 presents the methodology used in the user
survey and application of the machine learning algorithms. We de-
scribetheresultsfromthesurveyinSection4.1andtheresultsfrom
our application of machine learning for prediction in Section 4.2.
Finally, we discuss the limitations of our approach in Section 5 and
conclude in Section 6.
2. RELATED WORK
We group related work into four categories: work on privacy in
online social networks, coping strategies and mechanisms, auto-
mated support for policy speciﬁcation, and natural language pro-
cessing in the context of social media. We additionally discuss the
machine-learning algorithms we use in Section 3.2.
Privacy in online social networks.
Several studies have examined users’ concerns related to shar-
ing on online social networks (OSNs). Krasnova et al. used fo-
cus groups to ﬁnd that users had a broad range of worries, ranging
from oversharing with friends, relatives, and coworkers to their on-
line data being mined by corporations [19]. Besmer and Lipford
examined users’ concerns about sharing photos, similarly ﬁnding
that social network privacy tools do not satisfactorily address users’
needs [6]. Johnson et al. discovered that while the overwhelm-
ing majority of social-network users is concerned about revealing
information to strangers, most users have taken steps to mitigate
these concerns (e.g., by using appropriate privacy policies); on the
other hand, many users also had speciﬁc concerns about sharing
content with friends and acquaintances that they were not address-
ing as effectively [17]. Hu et al. explain how policy conﬂicts can
arise when multiple users have a stake in the privacy policy (e.g.,
multiple Facebook users that are tagged in a photo) and suggest
strategies for resolving such conﬂicts [15].
Less abstractly, studies have found that users are unsuccessful at
using privacy controls and other mechanisms to avoid oversharing.
Liu et al. found prevalent use of default privacy settings and a low
match between privacy settings and users’ expectations [23]. Other
researchers found through an in-depth interview study that OSN
users often overshare and regret it [40], with speciﬁc consequences
ranging from temporary embarrassment to broken romantic rela-
tionships and lost jobs. The results of our user study (Section 4.1)
are consistent with these ﬁndings.
Researchers have recently also looked at the effect that privacy
concerns have on the continued usage of OSNs, with mixed ﬁnd-
ings. Tufecki reported ﬁnding no correlation between users’ OSN
sharing habits and their concerns about the privacy of their age,
gender, interests, and other similar proﬁle information [38]. Recent
evidence, however, suggests that the inability of users to have con-
ﬁdence that their dynamic content (e.g., status updates and posts)
will be shared according to their preferences is a major factor in
determining the frequency of use of social networks [36].
Coping strategies and mechanisms.
In reaction to these problems, users employ a number of cop-
ing strategies beyond the features offered by OSNs. Some users
moved away from broadcast content (e.g., status updates and posts)
towards private messages [42]. Others maintain multiple online
proﬁles or accounts, using each to interact with a different audi-
ence [34]. Finally, deleting friends and posts and removing tags
from posts are also increasingly used [24].
Also in an attempt to mitigate these problems, OSNs have been
enhanced with features that make it easier for users to set and un-
derstand privacy policies. These include Google+’s “circles,” Face-
book’s “Smart Lists,” and interfaces that allow a user to understand
in detail which of her published content is visible to which other
users (e.g., Facebook’s “Audience View”). Researchers have alsoadvanced new tools and approaches, including better visualizations
of friend groups and networks [25], and experimented with differ-
ent policy-creation approaches, such as tag-based policy, in which
policies are speciﬁed exclusively in terms of tags with which con-
tent is labeled [18]. Although all these mechanisms help, none
that have been deployed have been reported to signiﬁcantly miti-
gate users’ concerns and problems with oversharing (e.g., [41]).
Automated support for policy speciﬁcation.
There is a long history of using machine learning to help de-
tect policy errors or specify policy. An early target of such analy-
sis were ﬁrewall policies, for which tools were developed to ana-
lyze policies for consistency or the presence of speciﬁed properties
(e.g., [3, 1]). Similar approaches were used to suggest to ﬁrewall
administrators policies that match prespeciﬁed goals [16]. Other
works used rule mining and Bayesian inference to analyze router
policies and automatically detect conﬁguration errors (e.g., [21]).
Related techniques, including rule mining, have also been used
in other contexts to detect policy errors. Das et al. analyzed ﬁle-
server access-control policy to detect inconsistencies in the permis-
sions given to otherwise similar users [11]. Bauer et al. examined
logs of accesses to physical space and inferred which potential ac-
cesses that are not permitted by policy are consistent with observed
accesses [4].
Closer to this paper’s focus, machine learning has been used to
classify images uploaded to content-sharing sites and to suggest
sharing policies [35]. In that work, photos are ﬁrst classiﬁed ac-
cording to image content, and then the resulting categories are fur-
ther broken down based on descriptive tags that users attach to the
photos. Our work pursues a similar goal for text content such as
posts and status updates, but the speciﬁc algorithms and features
used for classiﬁcation in the two approaches differ.
Closely related to this paper is work by Fang et al., which ad-
dresses the problem of allowing friends access to information in a
user’s OSN proﬁle [13]. This work assumes that there is an under-
lying privacy preference that needs to be learned. The problem we
address is different, as we aim to predict the access control policy
that should be applied to status messages, which involves mapping
information contained in a status message to the privacy setting.
Natural language processing for social media.
Natural language processing (NLP) has been used extensively
in analyzing social media content from microblogs (e.g., Twitter),
OSNs, wikis, internet forums, etc. The purposes of such analyses
vary, and include opinion and sentiment mining [26], determining
the usefulness of product reviews [22], topic extraction [7], and ex-
amining the diffusion of information through social networks [2].
Using NLP for analyzing short text such as from microblogs and
OSNs is an active area of research [31, 33]. We try two popular
NLP approaches: one is a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [7]
based approach and another a classiﬁer based on the MaxEnt (max-
imum entropy) [5] principle (see Section 3.2).
3. METHODOLOGY
We next describe the online study by which we collected data for
training and testing machine-learning algorithms (Section 3.1), and
provide an overview of our approach to predicting policy, including
describing the algorithms we used (Section 3.2).
3.1 Study Design
We recruited participants through Craigslist, compensating them
$5 for participation in a 20-minute survey. We required participants
to be English-speaking adults, to have created at least 60 Facebook
posts or status updates over the past four months, and to have used
at least two different privacy settings to protect their posts.
After asking participants for demographic data, we asked them
about their usage of Facebook. We asked whether they used Face-
book for personal or business purposes. Using a seven-point Lik-
ert scale, we asked participants to indicate their level of agreement
with statements that probed how comfortable they would be with
their Facebook posts being publicly visible, whether they post per-
sonal information, and whether they believe they use strong privacy
rules. We also asked whether they found Facebook’s privacy con-
trols easy to use, or confusing, and whether they had ever regretted
posting content on a social network. We did not tell participants the
purpose of our study, other than it was about “Facebook sharing.”
Our participants were next redirected to our Facebook applica-
tion. The application compiled a list of each participants’ posts and
their privacy settings, which were then downloaded for analysis.
Study participants were given the chance to view their posts before
they were downloaded, and to exclude from downloading any par-
ticularly private ones; however, no participant excluded any post.
Next, 20 posts were drawn at random from the downloaded ones.
These were shown to the participant, who was asked to indicate her
preferred policy (i.e., privacy settings) for each post, by selecting
from among any of the policies the participant had used for any
post, or “other,” with the option of entering any policy. While elic-
iting the preferred policy for most posts would have given us more
ground truth data about policies, the extra burden on participants
would have increased the chance of participants providing incor-
rect data or dropping out of the study.
Our study design was reviewed and approved by our institutional
review board (IRB).
3.2 Predicting Policies
The goal of our work is to predict, based on the content and
context of a new Facebook post, the access-control policy that a
user will want to apply to it. We envision that a tool that performed
such prediction could be integrated with OSNs, and would suggest
tousersatthetimeofcontentcreationthepolicy, orseveralpossible
policies, with which to protect the new content. In this paper we
focus on determining whether and to what extent such a tool could
suggest policies that match users’ sharing intentions.
Facebook’s privacy policies for posts specify the audience as a
set of users. The set of users is speciﬁed with the help of predeﬁned
sets such as “public” (anyone, including people without Facebook
accounts), “friends of friends” (all Facebook users who are friends
of the friends of the user under consideration), and friend lists. A
friend list is a subset of all the user’s friends, and is either speciﬁed
manually by the user or is automatically generated by Facebook. In
addition, the user may specify a “deny” and “allow” list of friends
that further restricts or expands the intended audience for posts. In
our work, we transform each policy to a string (see Section 3.2.2),
which is then considered the label of that post.
The high-level approach we pursue is to train a machine-learning
algorithm on posts that are annotated with such labels, and then
use the trained algorithm to predict the policy of test posts. Our
training and test data are derived from the posts and policies down-
loaded from study participants’ Facebook accounts. Because users
strongly differ in the kind of content they publish and the sharing
policies they apply to it, we do not aggregate data across users—
we make predictions about a participant’s posts (test data) using
an algorithm trained only on that participant’s previous posts (but
excluding the posts we test on).We choose test data for each participant at random from the
chronological sequence of posts (or from a subset for which the
intended policy is known—see Section 4.2). For each test data
point, we build the learning model using training data that appears
chronologically before the test data point. We try to maximize av-
erage accuracy, the average success of prediction of the learned
model—a different model for each test data point—on the test data.
As is customary for small datasets, we select features by perform-
ing multi-fold cross validation in the training phase. We try all
combinations of the features that we consider, in addition to the ba-
sic feature of words in the post (see Section 4.2.3). We repeat 100
times the process of partitioning the training set of posts into 90%
model-buildingdataand10%evaluationdataforeachmodel(setof
features) under consideration; the training accuracy for a model is
the average over all 100 runs on a single participant’s data. Finally,
the model with the best training accuracy is selected for evaluation
over test data.
3.2.1 Machine-learning algorithms
Facebook posts and status messages (we use the two terms inter-
changeably)almostalwayscontainsomeuser-generatedtext. Hence,
a natural approach for analyzing these is to use tools from natural
language processing (NLP).
Latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) is a popular approach for ex-
tracting topics from documents [7]. The topic of a document is
a collection of words that represents the theme of the document.
Topic extraction refers to predicting the topic of a document using
words present in the document. An extension of LDA called la-
beled LDA (LLDA) can be used to infer labels for documents when
provided with training data of labeled documents [32]. We treated
posts as documents and their policies as labels, and used LLDA to
predict the policies for a test set of posts that did not have policies
attached. However, we found the performance of LLDA to be poor
in our setting. We attribute this to two factors. First, any LDA-
based approach requires a substantial amount of training data [30].
The size and number of posts, not just at our disposal for this exper-
iment but in general, is small compared to text documents typically
used in LDA-based approaches. Short-text topic extraction is an
active area of research [31, 33], but, based on our experiments, has
not advanced to the point where it would allow an LDA-based ap-
proach to be effective on the short messages typical of our domain
of interest. Second, classiﬁers (a class of machine-learning tools)
are comparable to LLDA for text classiﬁcation [32], and can ad-
ditionally use non-text features (e.g., the time of the post) to aid
in classiﬁcation. Consistently with this, we found LLDA not to be
competitive with a classiﬁer-based approach, described next.
A classiﬁer often used in NLP with good results, and which we
apply to our problem, is the MaxEnt classiﬁer [5]. A classiﬁer
attempts to predict the correct label for a given test dataset. A clas-
siﬁer takes as input a labeled training dataset, represents the data
as a vector in an n-dimensional space, and then learns a separa-
tor that best separates the data by labels. The learned separator is
used to predict the labels of the test data points. The n dimen-
sions of the data points are called features. A classiﬁer allows the
use of non-text features of posts, such as creation time, the pres-
ence of a URL, post length, etc. The MaxEnt classiﬁer is based
on the idea of obtaining the separator that maximizes entropy (and
hence yields low generalization error, i.e., low error on test data),
but constrained to achieving a low empirical error (performing well
on training data). The MaxEnt model assumes nothing beyond the
information provided by the training data, which enables the classi-
ﬁer to perform well on a randomly chosen test dataset. The MaxEnt
model is equivalent to the Multinomial Logistic Regression model,
another model for classiﬁcation in NLP [5]. Since we found the
MaxEnt model to perform strictly better than other approaches we
tried for our scenario, the results presented in this paper are based
on the MaxEnt classiﬁer.
We used the LLDA and MaxEnt tools created by the NLP Group
at Stanford (http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/). We ran
the tools using default settings, except the use of word bi-grams,
i.e., pairs of adjacent words, as a feature. Our parsing and result
computation code was written in Scala, with some analysis using
Microsoft Excel.
3.2.2 Data transformation
Next, wediscusshowwetransformedthecontentofparticipants’
posts before using them as input to machine-learning algorithms.
AsiscommoninNLP,wemakeallwordslowercase, removepunc-
tuation, and ﬁlter out stop words, which are are common words
like “a,” “an,” “it,” and “I” that convey little meaning. We used a
standard list of 120 stop words [37]. Filtering out stop words may
result in empty posts and hence decreases the amount of training
data, but generally increases prediction accuracy. For our dataset,
this removed three posts from just one user.
We also perform certain intuitive modiﬁcations on the data, after
empirically validating through preliminary experiments that these
improve the effectiveness of prediction. We replace URLs by only
the domain name, e.g., http://my.com/test becomes my.com.
We also transform text, like emoticons and some punctuation, that
is otherwise parsed in a semantically incorrect way. We replace
emoticons by a corresponding descriptive word, e.g., “:)” and “:-
)” are replaced by “happy.” We replace question marks (“?”) by
the word “question,” two or more contiguous exclamation marks
(“!”) by “exclaim,” and two or more contiguous periods (“.”) by
“continued.” The exact words used for replacement do matter; even
though the machine-learning tools do not understand the semantics
of words, the user may use those same words in some posts instead
of or independently from emoticons. Finally, we ﬁltered out posts
of fewer than three words, as these usually do not have enough
information to perform inference.
As stated earlier, for each participant, we map each privacy pol-
icy for a post to a unique string, which serves as a label for the post.
This is done by using symbolic strings for the three sets “public,”
“friends of friends,” and “all friends.” Any allow or deny list of
friends is taken into account by concatenating the symbolic string
with the sorted list of friend IDs speciﬁed in the allow or deny list.
For any privacy policy speciﬁed using friend lists, we use the con-
catenated, sorted list of IDs of friends in that list as the label, after
adding or removing friends from any allow or deny lists.
4. RESULTS
We ﬁrst present the results of the survey that solicited demo-
graphic data and usage habits and sentiment about Facebook (Sec-
tion 4.1). We then present our results from the use of machine
learning for policy prediction (Section 4.2).
4.1 Demographics and Survey
Demographic data.
From July to November 2012, 46 participants took our study and
met our requirements. The data for four participants is missing due
to data corruption; we present here the self-reported demographic
data from the remaining 42.
Our participants ranged in age from 18 to 65, with an average
of 29:1 and median 25:5. Thirty ﬁve participants reported being
female, and7 reportedmale. Sixteenparticipantsreportedacollege0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Regretted posting ever? (No/Yes)
Comfortable with public visibility of messages
Find privacy control confusing
Find privacy control easy to use
Have strong set of privacy rules
Post personal info
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neutral
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree
Figure 1: Participants’ answers when they were asked to agree or disagree with statements about behavior on and sentiment toward
Facebook (only selected questions shown).
degree as their highest achieved degree, 16 reported ﬁnishing high-
school, and four receiving an advanced degree. Four participants
reported majoring or having a degree or job in “computer science,
computer engineering, information technology, or a related ﬁeld;”
36 did not, and two did not provide an answer. One participant was
from Singapore, one from Guatemala, one fromRussia, and the rest
were from the U.S.A.
Facebook usage and sentiment.
Asked whether they found Facebook’s privacy controls “con-
fusing,” participants answers were almost evenly distributed from
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” on a 7-point Likert scale,
with a small majority expressing some level of agreement. How-
ever, presented with the statement that Facebook’s privacy controls
are “easy to use,” 27 participants agreed and only nine disagreed.
Somewhat surprising is that participants who self-identiﬁed as hav-
ing good computer skills were almost evenly divided on these ques-
tions, suggesting that computer-savvy participants were less likely
than other participants to ﬁnd Facebook’s privacy controls easy to
use.
Asked whether they have a “strong set of privacy rules” on Face-
book, 28 participants replied neutrally or positively and there was
no strongly negative reply, indicating that most participants felt
theyusedaverageorstronger-than-averageprivacypoliciesonFace-
book. Asked whether they tended to post personal information on
Facebook, 21 participants indicated that they did not.
Asked whether they were comfortable with their status message
being visible to “everyone on the internet” on a 7-point scale from
“not at all comfortable” to “very comfortable,” 19 participants ex-
pressed various levels of comfort, 15 expressed various levels of
discomfort, and 8 were neutral. We found this level of comfort
with public sharing surprising, as well as inconsistent with both the
policies our participants implemented or wished to implement and
the negative experiences they reported with sharing data on Face-
book. This disconnect highlights the need for tools that remind
participants to set a more restrictive policy for posts for which an
overly open policy may lead to later discomfort or regret.
Ofour42participants, 25answeredpositivelywhenaskedwheth-
er they had “ever posted something on a social network and then
regretted doing it,” which is more participants than reported being
uncomfortable sharing their posts with everyone on the Internet.
Reasons that participants reported ranged from friends getting of-
fended to people not thinking enough before posting from a smart-
phone. One participant stated that he is an attorney and exercised
signiﬁcant discretion in posting messages, and thus never had any
mishaps. Another participant believed that expressing her thoughts
will not have a negative impact on her life, and hence she does not
Table 1: Conﬁdence factor for 42 participants.
Conﬁdence factor No. of users
0–0.25 7
0.26–0.50 7
0.51–0.75 12
0.76–1.00 16
regret anything she ever posted. Figure 1 depicts answers to select
questions on user sentiment.
Not counting automatically generated messages (e.g., “check-
ins” from location-tracking applications), our participants created
6150 posts (average 146 per person, std. dev. 89:3, median 117:5)
in the four months preceding their participation in our survey. Al-
thoughparticipantscouldexcludespeciﬁcpostsfrombeingsubmit-
ted to us, no participant excluded any post. We excluded 17 posts
from our analysis, because Facebook’s API returned an empty pri-
vacy policy for them. Participants used between two and 35 poli-
cies to protect their posts, with an average of 4.6 (std. dev. 5:4) and
median of 3.
Conﬁdence about policies.
As explained in Section 3.1, we randomly selected 20 posts from
eachstudyparticipantandinteractivelyelicited fromtheparticipant
the policy she desired to implement (the intended policy) for each.
The purpose of this was to measure how often participants either
changed their minds about policies after implementing them or had
not implemented their intended policies. We refer to the fraction
of the 20 that matched the implemented policy as the conﬁdence
factor. For example, if 15 of the 20 interactively elicited (intended)
policies matched the user’s intended policies for those messages,
the conﬁdence factor is .75.
Table 1 shows the counts of participants by conﬁdence factor
ranges. Fourteen participants changed their mind about or incor-
rectlyimplementedthepolicyformorethan50%ofthepostsshown
to them, and only 16 participants have 75% or more of their posts
labeled correctly on Facebook. This phenomenon results in noisy
data for the learning tools; in Section 4.2.4 we show its effect on
the accuracy of learning.
4.2 Policy Prediction
In this section we present our results on using machine learn-
ing to predict policy. We ﬁrst describe the datasets and the success
criteria for evaluating the accuracy of predictions (Section 4.2.1).
We then describe the prediction mechanisms that we use as a base-
line (Section 4.2.2) and the features used with the MaxEnt classiﬁer
(Section 4.2.3). Finally, we discuss the effectiveness of our predic-
tion strategy (Section 4.2.4).Figure 2: Datasets used in evaluation and their construction.
4.2.1 Datasets and Success Metrics
Datasets.
To investigate the effects of noise (i.e., erroneous policies) in
training data on prediction performance, we evaluate on three data-
sets.
1. Original: The original dataset is comprised of the posts and
policies downloaded from participants’ Facebook accounts.
The policies in this dataset match what participants imple-
mented in Facebook, even when they did so by mistake or
later changed their mind.
2. Clean: The clean dataset is constructed from the original
dataset by replacing the downloaded policies for 20 posts
withthecorrespondinginteractivelyelicitedpolicies. Inother
words, in the clean dataset 20 potentially erroneous entries
have been corrected using the interactively elicited data; re-
maining entries are the same as in the original dataset.
3. Pruned clean: The pruned clean dataset is constructed from
the clean dataset by discarding the 80% of the unconﬁrmed,
possibly erroneous data, leaving the corrected 20 entries as
is in the remaining 20% data.
Figure 2 illustrates the creation and contents of these datasets.
When we test on the clean and pruned clean datasets, we test
on data drawn solely from the 20 policies per participant that were
manuallyelicited, asweconsiderthesetobeclosesttogroundtruth.
We discuss this further in Section 4.2.2.
Success metrics.
We use two metrics to measure the success of a prediction.
1. Exact: The prediction is counted as successful when the pre-
dicted policy is the same as the policy that the user assigned
to the post.
2. Top-Two: Thepredictioniscountedassuccessfulwheneither
of the two policies predicted as most likely is the policy that
the user assigned to the post. This simulates a scenario in
which the prediction algorithm is used to generate two policy
suggestions for each message.
The ratio of successful predictions to the total number of pre-
dictions is the accuracy of the prediction strategy. By deﬁnition,
the Top-Two metric always outperforms the Exact metric in this re-
spect. Although we report performance according to both metrics,
we believe the Exact metric (on which we focus when reporting
summary results) is more realistic, since it would likely yield a
more usable tool in practice and can be more fairly compared to
Facebook’s default approach.
4.2.2 Baseline Prediction Strategies
Next, we present the two prediction strategies that we use as
baselines. These are straightforward ways to predict policy and
involve no machine learning. We consider the following baselines:
1. Previous Policy: For the current post, suggest the policy used
on the last post.
2. Most Common: Always suggest the policy used most com-
monly by the participant in the four-month span for which
we have data.
Wereporttheaccuraciesofthebaselinestrategiesfortwodatasets
(original and clean), as well as reporting the intended accuracy,
where predictions are restricted to the 20 posts for which the in-
tended policy is known. The accuracy for each participant for
the original and the clean dataset is computed by iterating over all
posts, predicting a policy for each post using the baseline approach,
and counting the number of successful predictions. The intended
accuracy is computed similarly, but the iteration is only over the 20
corrected posts for which the intended policy is known.
Facebook currently implements the Previous Policy approach.
This approach performs well on the original dataset (85% average
accuracy), slightly worse on the clean dataset (80% average accu-
racy), but has poorer accuracy when tested against intended policy
(67% on average), which is the measure we consider most mean-
ingful, since for that measure all test data points are conﬁrmed to
be accurate. The performance of Most Common (79%, 77%, 73%)
follows a similar trend. Table 2 shows these results in more detail.
The Top-Two metric clearly results in a greater fraction of poli-
cies predicted correctly, since its criteria for correctness is less
stringent than that of the Exact metric. We speculate that the high
accuracy of Previous Policy (for the original dataset) can be at-
tributed to the fact that many participants have a dominant policy,
and often do not change their policy over a set of contiguous posts.
Using the same policy for consecutive posts may make sense se-
mantically, e.g., if all the posts in the set are on the same topic. On
the other hand, it could also reﬂect policy errors caused by partici-
pants’ reluctance to change their policy from the default offered by
Facebook. Indeed, the lower accuracy when evaluating against in-
tended policy reveals a mismatch between Facebook’s predictions
and intended policy for many participants.
We also experimented with another success metric: whether the
predicted policy was at least as restrictive as the desired policy.
The accuracy with such a success metric was quite high—0.94 with
the Previous Policy baseline—which is not unexpected due to the
coarse nature of this success metric. The use of the MaxEnt clas-
siﬁer did not yield much better results than 0.94; thus, we do not
analyze this success metric further in this paper. Also, while over-
sharing is clearly a problem, undersharing diminishes the utility of
sharing. Hence, we focus mainly on exact matches.Table 2: Average performance of baseline approaches for 42 participants.
Baseline metric
Avg. accuracy
(original dataset)
Avg. accuracy
(clean dataset)
Avg. intended
accuracy
(clean dataset)
Previous Policy 0.85 0.80 0.67
Most Common 0.79 0.77 0.73
Previous Policy (Top-Two) 0.91 0.88 0.74
Most Common (Top-Two) 0.88 0.85 0.85
4.2.3 Features Available for Model Selection
Before describing results in detail, we discuss the features avail-
able to the learning algorithms. The subset of these that was used
in any speciﬁc model (recall that a sequence of models was created
for each participant, as described in Section 3.2) is derived by try-
ing all combinations of features and using cross-validation to select
the best combination. In addition to the words of a post, which is
a feature included in all models, other features were post creation
time, the presence of attachments, word n-grams, and the policy
of the post immediately preceding the post for which a model was
being generated.
The basic feature we used was the words that made up the con-
tent of posts. The MaxEnt classiﬁer tool we used automatically
converts words into a vector representation, although we ﬁrst man-
ually remove stop words and perform other low-level transforma-
tions (see Section 3.2).
We examined several bucketing strategies to represent the time
when a post is created. The most effective strategy, on which we
settled, classiﬁed posts into three buckets: (1) ofﬁce: between 9AM
and 6PM on weekdays, (2) evenings and weekends: between 6PM
and midnight daily and between 9AM and 6PM on weekends, and
(3) nights: midnight to 9AM daily. We also experimented with six
buckets of four hours each, but with less success.
We encoded as a binary ﬂag whether a post included an attach-
ment such as an image, video, or a URL (which may be different
from URLs contained in the text of a post).
We additionally used word 2-grams as a feature, as often the
semantics of a sentence is better captured by pair of adjacent words
than by each word in isolation. For example, if a post includes the
words “Sherlock” and “Holmes,” then in addition to each of those
words being used as a feature, the bi-gram “Sherlock Holmes” is
also used.
Finally, we included the policy of the previous post as a feature,
hypothesizing that for some participants this may be a good indica-
tor of the policy for the current post.
Another feature we experimented with, but do not use in the re-
sults we report, was the number of words in posts. Including this
feature reduced the accuracy on the pruned clean dataset by 6%.
We conjecture this is because of the large number (compared to
the size of pruned clean dataset) of possible values for this feature;
this can cause the learned model to over-ﬁt the training data, con-
sequently reducing testing accuracy.
TheMaxEnttoolperformsastandardtransformationonthewords,
by mapping each word (or bi-gram) to a dimension to build a multi-
dimensional dataset with 0’s and 1’s. The zeros indicate absence of
a word and vice versa. The other features described above are all
categorical variables, each adding a dimension to this dataset.
4.2.4 Policy Prediction Accuracy
As discussed in Section 4.2.1, we analyze the performance of
policy prediction using the original dataset, the clean dataset (in
Table 3: Average accuracy for baselines and MaxEnt with Ex-
act and Top-Two success metrics, using the clean and pruned
clean datasets.
Avg. intended accuracy
Prediction strategy (Exact) (Top-Two)
Previous Policy 0.67 0.74
Most Common 0.73 0.85
MaxEnt (clean dataset) 0.71 0.94
MaxEnt (pruned clean dataset) 0.81 0.94
which 20 of a participants’ implemented Facebook policies have
been substituted with those interactively elicited from her), and the
pruned clean dataset. When analyzing performance on the original
dataset, we randomly pick eight policies to use as test data and
calculate accuracy as described in Section 3.2; these eight are never
used for training. When using the clean and pruned clean datasets,
we choose the test data from among the 20 policies elicited from
the participant.
Our experiments using the LLDA tool show strictly less accu-
rate performance than using MaxEnt, by a signiﬁcant amount: on
the original dataset the average accuracy of predictions made using
LLDA was 0:62 using words only—including other features is not
possible with LLDA in a straightforward fashion. Hence, we focus
on results obtained by using the MaxEnt classiﬁer.
Accuracy with original dataset.
The accuracy of the MaxEnt classiﬁer on the original dataset is
0:86 for the Exact and 0:94 for the Top-Two metric. When making
a single prediction per candidate post (i.e., Exact), the average ac-
curacy of the MaxEnt classiﬁer on the original dataset is only 1%
better than the better of the two baselines (Table 2). We believe this
is because the trends in the original dataset are largely the result of
Facebook’s use of the Previous Policy strategy. The MaxEnt tool
successfully picks up these trends in the original dataset. However,
learning the trend in the original dataset does not help make good
predictions of intended policy, since the trends are dominated by
inaccurate data; we show this next.
Accuracy with clean and pruned clean dataset.
More indicative of real-world effectiveness is prediction accu-
racy measured with respect to the clean and pruned clean datasets
(Table 3). For both these datasets, the test data is chosen from
among the 20 posts with correct intended policy. In this setting,
the MaxEnt classiﬁer has slightly higher accuracy (71%) on the
clean dataset than does the Previous Policy baseline (67%) for the
Exact case. The corresponding MaxEnt accuracy (Exact) on the0.71
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Figure 3: Average intended accuracy of MaxEnt using the Ex-
act metric when different fractions of unconﬁrmed training
data are discarded.
pruned clean dataset (in which some potentially erroneous data is
discarded) is substantially better (81%), yielding more than 45%
fewer incorrect predictions than the baseline.
WeattributethedifferencesintheperformanceofMaxEntacross
our datasets to the mismatch between a participant’s implemented
policy and her intended policy. Accuracy on the clean dataset is not
much greater than on the original one because the vast majority of
training data is unconﬁrmed, and hence the intended policy is not
successfully learned from it. Testing on the pruned clean dataset
reveals that when some unconﬁrmed data is removed, increasing
the fraction of good data, prediction accuracy increases.
To further test this hypothesis, we experimented with changing
the fraction of clean training data by discarding varying fractions
of the unconﬁrmed data; this makes each training set smaller, but
increases the proportion of clean data. As the fraction of clean data
in the training set grows, prediction accuracy improves (Figure 3).
Decreasing the size of the training set would normally be expected
to decrease accuracy; in this case, that is more than made up for
by the increase in the quality of the training data as the training set
shrinks.
We next further investigate the dependence of prediction accu-
racy on the quality of the training data.
Accuracy vs. conﬁdence factor.
Recall that a low conﬁdence factor means that the 20 intended
policies supplied by participants were frequently not the policies
thatwereactuallyimplementedforthecorrespondingpostsonFace-
book. An examination of the (clean and pruned clean datasets) re-
sults by subsets of participants split by conﬁdence factor yields an
interesting observation—for participants with high conﬁdence in
their policies, the MaxEnt classiﬁer has substantially better aver-
age accuracy than the baseline approaches (Table 4).
This provides further support for the behavior we had previously
observed: when trained on good data, MaxEnt predicts policies
more accurately than the baseline strategies. More speciﬁcally, the
participants with a low conﬁdence factor are those whose Facebook
policies typically do not correspond to their intentions. Since the
accuracy of prediction is measured with respect to intended policy
(interactively elicited during the study), it is no surprise that train-
ing on data that is highly inconsistent with intended policy does not
allow accurate prediction of intended policy. From the standpoint
of learning, a low conﬁdence factor implies that there is signiﬁcant
Table5: Resultofexcludingfeatureswithprunedcleandataset.
The last column shows the number of users for whom predic-
tion was most accurate with the set of features described by
each row. The ﬁrst row shows performance with no feature ex-
cluded.
Excluded Features Avg. intended
accuracy
# users w/
best acc.y attachment n-gram last policy time
0.81 25
5 0.76 9
5 5 0.79 14
5 5 5 0.75 9
5 5 5 5 0.79 11
y There is overlap in the sets of users that characterize best accuracy of
each set of features. Hence, sum of last column > 42.
noise in the labels (policies) present in the training data; machine-
learning algorithms perform poorly at classiﬁcation as the fraction
of noise in labels increases [20]. Ignoring the 14 (33%) partici-
pants who have conﬁdence factor lower than 0:5, the improvement
in accuracy for the remaining 28 (66%) participants is on an aver-
age 0:14 and the resulting average accuracy is 0:94. This accuracy
is comparable to the 94% accuracy reported by NLP topic mod-
eling tools like LDA [7]. Additionally, Table 4 also shows that dis-
carding 80% of the unconﬁrmed data (pruned clean dataset) results
in improved predictions for almost all users, including those with a
low conﬁdence factor. Notably, the accuracy for users in the low-
est conﬁdence class, even though low in absolute terms, was more
than double the accuracy of the Facebook baseline (0.25 to 0.52).
In other words, although greatest absolute accuracy is achieved for
users with a high conﬁdence factor, on average even users with a
low conﬁdence factor beneﬁt from our predictions.
Accuracy by feature.
Perhaps surprisingly, we found that the average prediction accu-
racy was affected only slightly by excluding various features from
our models (Table 5)—the majority of the beneﬁt stems from an-
alyzing the text of posts. Interestingly, the decrease in accuracy
was not monotonic as features were removed, showing that their
interplay is subtle. We believe that this is because individual users
beneﬁted differently from the various features. This is supported
by the data in the last column of Table 5, which shows the number
of users for whom the feature set under consideration performed
best. All the features together perform best for the largest num-
ber of users (25); smaller sets of feature perform best for different
numbers of users, ranging from 9 to 14.
Prediction accuracy over time.
As described in Section 3.2, we train our prediction algorithm to
mimic how a real-time prediction tool could be used: only posts
that appeared chronologically before an element (post) of the test
set are used to train the model used to make predictions for that test
post. Figure 4 shows the average (over all participants) accuracy
of MaxEnt for predicting each of the eight elements of the test set
in chronological order. Accuracy is initially poor, as only 12.5%
of the training data is available when the ﬁrst prediction is made.
Perhaps surprisingly, however, accuracy almost immediately rises
to the range where it will remain. This suggests that, in practice,
the accuracy of prediction can be improved by not making predic-
tions when too little data is available, but also paints a surprisingly
optimistic picture of how little training data is needed to achieve
reasonable prediction accuracy. Delaying predictions in this wayTable 4: Prediction accuracy of Previous Policy and MaxEnt (on the clean and pruned clean datasets), using the Exact metric, split
by Conﬁdence factor.
Conﬁdence
factor
Previous Policy
avg. intended
acc.
MaxEnt avg. intended acc.
and # users with better acc.
(clean dataset)
MaxEnt avg. intended acc.
and # users with better acc.
(pruned clean dataset)
0–0.25 0.25 0.23 (2 of 7) 0.52 (6 of 7)
0.26–0.50 0.58 0.62 (4 of 7) 0.58 (3 of 7)
0.51–0.75 0.62 0.68 (6 of 12) 0.88 (10 of 12)
0.76–1.00 0.91 0.96 (14 of 16) 0.98 (14 of 16)
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Figure 4: Average intended accuracy of MaxEnt using the Ex-
act metric on the clean dataset, for each element of the test set
in chronological order (e.g., “1” indicates the chronologically
ﬁrst element of the test set; “8” the chronologically last).
would hence also result in higher accuracy than we reported earlier
in this section.
Correlating data characteristics with accuracy.
To more precisely characterize the apparent differences in the
performance of prediction based on the conﬁdence factor, we com-
pute the Pearson correlation coefﬁcient, which is a standard mea-
sure for determining linear dependence between two variables. We
found the Pearson correlation of the accuracy of MaxEnt classi-
ﬁer (pruned clean dataset) with the conﬁdence factor to be 0:67
(p < :001), indicating a strong correlation (correlation values of
magnitude greater than 0:5 are held to mean strong correlation in
behavioral sciences [9]).
Another factor we considered to better understand the perfor-
mance of MaxEnt on a per-user basis relates to those privacy poli-
cies that were each applied by a participant to fewer than 30 posts
(sparse policies). The sparse class factor is the fraction of all poli-
cies used by a participant that are sparse, e.g., for a user with two
policies a sparse class factor of 0:5 means that one of the two poli-
cieswasusedforlessthan30posts. Weconsiderthisfactorbecause
classiﬁers are known to perform poorly if the amount of training
data for a particular label (class) is small and those labels show up
in test data [29]. While the correlation of the sparse class factor
with the difference between MaxEnt classiﬁer accuracy and base-
line accuracy is not signiﬁcant, the sparse class factor for the three
participants for whom prediction accuracy was worst is high (Ta-
ble 6). Their average sparse class factor is 0:84, indicating that
these participants use a dominant policy, and use other policies in-
frequently enough for this to pose a problem for prediction.
Table 6: Conﬁdence factor and sparse class factor for the three
participants for whom MaxEnt performed worst (using the Ex-
act metric, on pruned clean dataset).
Participant
ID Accuracy
Conﬁdence
factor
Sparse class
factor
2 0.16 0.50 0.80
19 0.25 0.20 0.81
20 0.28 0.15 0.91
The correlation between accuracy and conﬁdence factor, and the
high sparse factor of participants for whom prediction performs
poorly, demonstrate known behavior of classiﬁer performance with
noisy labeling (policies, in our case) and low amounts of data per
label: the presence of either factor reduces the accuracy of our pre-
dictions with the clean dataset. For existing Facebook posts it is
reasonable to expect noisy labeling, as our survey and other re-
sults (e.g., [23]) have shown. Also, many participants in our survey
used a dominant policy, and hence other policies (labels) were as-
sociated with small amount of data. The latter factor is likely to
remain a problem for prediction regardless of the accuracy of the
training data: if very few posts use a speciﬁc policy, predicting that
policy is unlikely to be accurate. The former factor, however—the
noisiness of the data—is one that could be mitigated in practice if
prediction were integrated into Facebook, e.g., by better interfaces
for specifying policy, or by periodic, interactive spot-checking of
the accuracy of policies. Indeed, when used in practice a prediction
mechanism such as the one we explore here would lead to more
accurate policies, in turn providing more accurate training data and
hence further improved prediction.
5. LIMITATIONS
This section discusses several limitations of our approach, in-
cluding those related to noisy data, data collection methodology,
our focus on text content, and sample size.
Our survey results show that the policies chosen by participants
are often not reﬂective of the intended policy, both impacting the
performance of machine-learning algorithms and making it chal-
lenging to interpret results. We address the problem caused by this
inaccuracy in two ways: (1) by discarding some noisy data, and (2)
by evaluating performance on more accurate and less accurate data
independently. We use participants’ inputs to correct their privacy
policy, which relies on the critical assumption that users are able to
properly assign privacy policies during the survey.
Since the accuracy of policies attached to posts used for both
training and testing is important for precise evaluation, a naturalquestion is whether true intended policies can be collected for all
posts created by our participants. Unfortunately, this was not fea-
sible given our survey methodology: Participants in online surveys
are typically less motivated than participants in laboratory or other
in-person studies. Hence, our study design had to strike a balance
between collecting enough data for analysis and asking few enough
questions that participants would not lose focus and start providing
incorrect answers. As future work, we are considering alternative
data-collection methodologies, including long-running studies in
which participants’ are periodically asked, over weeks or months,
aboutthepoststheyhaverecentlycreated. Anotheralternativeisin-
person surveys structured similarly to the online survey described
in this paper. Both of these would involve substantial additional
effort, and so are out of scope for this paper.
Our use of machine learning focused on the text content of posts.
Although we included as features to be used for learning the pres-
ence of an attachment or URL, we did not analyze the content of
such attachments. Doing so, particularly for images included in
posts, would have required the use of different techniques from the
ones we utilized. Research that focused solely on images has found
them to be amenable to classiﬁcation that could potentially help
in setting privacy policies [35]. This suggests that including both
image and text analysis to make policy predictions is a promising
direction to explore; we defer it to future work.
Our ﬁndings are based on the 42 participants who took our sur-
vey, which is a small sample size when compared to the total num-
ber of Facebook users, leading to questions about the generaliz-
ability of our results. While a larger sample is desirable, methodol-
ogy and resource constraints made that infeasible. Such limitations
are unfortunately common; many Facebook human subjects exper-
iments, including some thematically close to ours, are restricted to
samples of 20–60 users (e.g., [25, 12, 27, 39, 14, 8]). Because our
use of machine learning utilized data on a per-user basis (i.e., train-
ing and testing took place on a single individual’s data), a larger
sample size would not have directly beneﬁted the efﬁcacy of learn-
ing, but it would increase the likelihood that the sample was rep-
resentative of the Facebook population. Our sample did, however,
cover a wide range both in terms of demographics and in terms
of the accuracy of users’ policies (i.e., noisiness of data); hence,
even given the limitations of our sample size, we believe that our
ﬁndings strongly suggest that applying techniques like the ones we
study in this paper could aid vast numbers of social network users
in setting their privacy policies.
6. CONCLUSION
Researchhasshown, andourresultsconﬁrm, thatFacebookusers
often fail to judiciously set the privacy policies for their posts [23].
We demonstrate that machine learning can accurately predict, us-
ing existing data, the policies with which users want to protect their
Facebook posts. Using the MaxEnt classiﬁer we predict policies
with an average accuracy of 81%, compared to the 67% average ac-
curacy obtained by following the default Facebook strategy of sug-
gesting the policy that was used for the last post. In other words,
our application of machine learning to policy prediction reduces
the number of posts for which policy is misconﬁgured by over 45%
on average. Moreover, for users whose implemented Facebook pri-
vacy policies are consistent with their intentions for more than 50%
of their posts, the MaxEnt classiﬁer correctly predicts policies for
94% of new posts. Hence, any practical use of machine learning
for an existing system would beneﬁt from taking into account the
difference between implemented and intended policies.
Primary challenges in applying machine learning to predicting
intended policies seem to be inaccuracies in implemented policies
and, for some policies, a low number of posts per policy. We plan
to apply other machine-learning techniques to this problem. One
is “upsampling,” in which data is selectively duplicated to mitigate
the problem of low data in a class. Another is using a multiclass
SVM classiﬁer, which is also often used in NLP applications.
While our work provides insights about privacy policy manage-
ment on Facebook, a number of interesting open questions remain.
For example, is there more than one “correct” privacy policy for
a particular post? It may be that a user would be equally satisﬁed
with any of several privacy policies being used to protect a par-
ticular post. Another question is whether categorization of posts
using a big knowledge base, e.g., Wikipedia, can improve the per-
formance of machine learning. Wikipedia can be used to extract
categories of words, revealing commonalities in meaning that are
not obvious from a purely syntactic interpretation of text; this tech-
nique has been used previously in NLP applications [43]. These
and other questions form fertile ground for future work.
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